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nership, or by the husband as an employee of someone
else, or by the employee of the husband, similarly form
a clear cut group very unlikely of growing out of intimate
relations between the spouses and which may safely be de-
marcated from personal torts generally so that litigation
concerning them should be permitted.
It is as simple to draw the line between these torts
and other personal torts as it has already proven to be
to draw the distinction between all personal torts on the
one hand and the property tort and contract situations on
the other.
CONTRACT FOR LIFE-TIME EMPLOYMENT HELD
VOID FOR INDEFINITENESS OF SUBJECT
MATTER-BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY V. KING1
Plaintiff -appellee was injured while employed as brake-
man by the defendant-appellant company. An officer of the
company urged plaintiff not to enter suit, saying: "We are
going to give you a job for life, if you listen to me; there
is something you can have at Baltimore or at Washington,
as switchman, lots of jobs." After recovering from his
injury, plaintiff was employed by the defendant as switch-
man for twenty-two years with only a single interruption
of three months when plaintiff was "on call". In 1931 the
job was abolished, plaintiff was discharged and he brought
suit for damages for the breach of the oral contract of
the defendant to employ him for life in consideration of
his forbearance to sue on the claim. Judgment was given
for the plaintiff in the lower court and defendant appealed.
Held: Judgment reversed. Since neither the type of work
to be done, nr the wages to be received were specified, the
contract was too indefinite to be enforced.
The problem raised by the principal case is not entirely
new in Maryland. It was first considered in Heckler v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company,2 where the injured
'168 Md. 142, 176.Atl. 626 (1935).167 Md. 226, 173 At. 12 (1934).
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employee was promised a job for life or for so long as he
was able to do work of any kind about the shops or rail-
road. Defendant railroad demurred to the declaration on
the ground that it failed to express authority in the agent
from the board of directors to make the contract sued on.
The demurrer was sustained in the lower court. On appeal
the Court of Appeals held unanimously that the demurrer
should have been overruled, but by a majority of six to
two the Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court
on the ground that the contract was unenforceable for lack
of definiteness as to work and pay.
That contracts for employment for life will be sustained
in the proper case admits of no dispute, Heckler v. B. &
0. R. R. Co.' But it is equally true that such contracts
will be closely scrutinized, the courts, as a general rule,
looking with disfavor on such contracts due to certain in-
equities to which reference will be made later in this note.
A distinction has been generally noted by the courts in
life employment contracts between those in which the prom-
ise of employment for life is given for an outside consid-
eration as in the principal case and those in which it is
not." In cases included in the latter group the contention
is frequently made that such contracts for permanent em-
ployment are void for lack of mutuality because the em-
ployee has made no binding promise and is privileged to
quit at any time. But this rule is not applicable to contracts
contained in the former category, because there is consid-
eration for the employer's promise outside and in addition
to any promise on the part of the employee to serve for any
definite time. A release or a forbearance to bring suit is
ample consideration for the return promise even though the
employee has an unlimited option between serving and not
serving.5
It is clear that contracts for life employment are not
within that section of the Statute of Frauds as to contracts
* Ibid.
'18 R. C. L. 509; 35 A. L. R. 1432.
5 Corbin, Selected Readings in the Law of Contracts, 439; 50 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 453; Hartle v. Stahl & wife, 27 Md. 157, 171 (1867).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
not to be performed within a year since the time is indefinite
and it is possible for complete performance to take place
within a year.' Likewise, it is generally held that such
contracts are not against public policy as tending to impair
the efficiency of public service corporations by restricting
their future management.7
Some courts have considered the impossibility of ac-
curately establishing the damages as a ground for denying
relief due to the fact that the length of the employment
could not be fairly ascertained because of the option which
the employee had of quitting at any time,' but the weight
of authority has accepted the logical and reasonable view
that the employee must be considered to have exercised his
option to continue for life in the employment promised him.
Therefore, it is held that the measure of damages for breach
of a contract for permanent employment is the amount
which the employee would have earned up to the time of
trial together with the present worth of what he would be
able to earn in the future in the course of the probable dura-
tion of his life or ability to perform the services, legs any
sums which he would be able to earn in other employments.9
It can readily be seen from the foregoing discussion that
contracts such as the one illustrated in the principal case
are, in the absence of other evidential factors, valid unless
held to be unenforceable on the ground taken by the Court
of Appeals.
In considering the question of uncertainty it is essential,
in the first instance, to recognize certain fundamental propo-
sitions: (1) "In order to constitute a valid verbal or writ-
ten agreement, the parties must express themselves in such
terms that it can be ascertained, to a reasonable degree of
certainty, what they mean. And if an agreement be so
vague and indefinite that it is not possible to collect from it
the full intention of the parties, it is void; for neither the
court nor the jury can make an agreement for the parties.
Such a contract can neither be enforced in equity nor sued
o See Cole v. Singerly, 60 Md. 348, 354 (1883).
'50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454; 35 L. R. A. 513.
835 L. R. A. 516.
50 L. R. A. (N. B.) 453.
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upon in law"," (2) The law does not favor, but leans
against, the destruction of contracts on account of uncer-
tainty; therefore, the courts will, if possible, so construe
the contract as to carry into effect the reasonable intent of
the parties, if it can be ascertained. 1 (3) This intent may
be determined at times by reference to extrinsic facts rele-
vant to the inquiry."
There are three possibilities as to the terms of employ-
ment contracts. First, the duration may be indefinite.
Second, the wages to be paid may be indefinite. Third, the
work to be done may be indefinite. Or there may be com-
binations of the above.
Suppose A for consideration promises to give B a job.
It is clear that no court would recognize a binding con-
tract. 3 Suppose A for consideration promises B a job as
chauffeur. Again, it would seem that the overwhelming
weight of authority would refuse to enforce the contract.
14
Suppose A for consideration promises to give B a job at
five dollars per day. For the same reasons as in the last
cited hypothesis the courts would in the great majority of
instances refuse to enforce the contract.' Suppose A
promises for consideration to give B a job for life. In the
absence of other factors, the majority of the courts would
agree with the principal case and refuse enforcement on
the ground of uncertainty. 6
It is to be noted that in those cases in which the duration
of the employment is indefinite, the rule is well settled in
the great majority of states 7 and in Maryland that, al-
though there may be a quantum meruit recovery on services
10Thomson v. Gortner, 73 Md. 474, 482, 21 Atl. 371 (1891). See also, Re-
statement of Contracts, Sec. 32 and I Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.)
sec. 37.
" 6 R. C. L. 645; Middendorf, Williams & Co. v. Milburn Co., 134 Md. 385,
3S7, 107 Atl. 7 (1919).
12 I Page, Contracts (2nd Ed.) sec. 101. See also Milske v. Steiner Mantel
Co., 103 Md. 235, 246, 63 Atl. 471 (1906) ; Sherley v. Sherley, 118 Md. 1, 24,
84 Atl. 160 (1912).
" Restatement of Contracts. Sec. 32, comment (a).
14 See W. B. & A. R. R. Co. v. Moss, 127 Md. 12, 96 Atl. 273 (1915) ; McCul-
lough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 Atl. 176 (1887).
' See cases cited in preceding footnote.
"48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 435.
17 See (1925) 38 Har. L. R. 834.
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already performed, the contract will not be enforced. As
was said in W. B. &, A. Railroad Co. v. Moss"8 , "It is equally
well settled that no action will lie on the breach of a contract
of employment unless there is a definite time fixed for the
continuance of the employment. The reason for the rule is
that the hiring would be one merely at will and could be
terminated at the pleasure of either party". 1" It is gen-
erally held that the doctrine of reasonable time does not
apply to personal service contracts, although in England
the rule was otherwise and where an employment contract
was indefinite as to time, it was presumed to be for a year.2"
But modern cases in England assert that the employment is
terminable upon reasonable notice.2' It is suggested, that
the English view has the balance of both logic and justice
on its side,2" but the rule is well settled to the contrary.
However, the courts have made an important distinction in
applying this rule, for it seems to be different in cases where
the employee purchases the employment with a valuable
consideration outside the services which he renders from
day to day.23 In a number of cases contracts by railroad
companies to furnish "steady and permanent employment"
to employees in consideration of the relinquishment of
claims by the employees against the companies have been
construed to show an agreement on the part of the company
to furnish the employee with employment as long as the
latter is able, ready, and willing to perform such services
as the company may have for him to perform.24
The wisdom of this exception to the general rule is
manifest both as to fixing the duration of a specific contract
and as to establishing the enforceability of such contracts
in general. "Contracts providing employment to laborers
who have been injured in the service of the employer do not
interfere in any substantial way with the employer's control
over his business. They are reasonable, in that they enable
18 Supra note 14.
11 See also McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, supra note 14.
100 A. L. R. 835.
211 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.) 39.
' For criticism of the American rule see Ibid.
18 R. C. L. 509; 35 A. L. R. 1432.
21135 A. L. R. 1434; 8 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 283.
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the employer to obtain release from claims for damages
which may prove expensive to him, while providing a liveli-
hood to employees who have been injured in his service, and
who, because of such injury, may have difficulty in finding
employment elsewhere. They are not unusual, as the re-
ported cases abundantly witness; and it would be a harsh
rule which would deny validity to them and thus enable
employers, in disregard of their provisions, to discharge
with impunity emplqyees who had surrendered claims for
damages in reliance upon them. To say that, where the
employer does this, the employee is relegated to his original
claim for damages, does not meet the hardship suggested.
The employee is still confronted with the release which he
has signed; and it may well happen that with the passage of
time he may have lost the means of proving his case for
damages or may find it barred by the statute of limita-
tions."25 The existence of this distinction was recognized
by the Maryland court in the Heckler case,26 but the Court
refused to follow or reject it.
The remaining discussion will be confined to the hypo-
thetical case, already mentioned, where A for consideration
promises to give B a job for life, and the contract is attacked
on the ground of uncertainty. At the outset it is necessary
to distinguish two variations of that case. In the first, A
company injures B, an utter stranger. In consideration for
B's releasing his claim for damages, A company promises
to give B a job for life. In the second, B is injured in the
course of his employment with A company and in considera-
tion for B's releasing his claim for damages, A company
promises to give B a job for life. Stripped of all but the
essential contractual elements, it would appear that the
above cited illustrations were identical. In each the dura-
tion of the employment is fixed, but neither the wage nor
the kind of employment is established. Granting, therefore,
that the two set-ups are objectively similar, there are, never-
theless, important distinctions of degree which render the
second illustration more capable of certainty than the first.
Royster Guano Co. v. Hall (C. C. A. 4th) 68 F. (2d) 533, 536 (1934).
Supra note 2, 167 Md. 226, 231.
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Applying the maxim, "Id certum est quod certum reddi
potest" (that is certain which may be rendered certain) and
the rule that the courts should endeavor to attach a sufficient
meaning to indefinite contracts, we are met with immediate
difficulties. In the first illustration, conceding that a bind-
ing contract was intended by the parties and conceding that
if the contract is held unenforceable it will work an injustice
on the promisee, it nevertheless, remains a problem to as-
certain or fix the terms of the agreement. By what stan-
dards, it may be asked, can the court arrive at a conclusion
as to what constituted the agreement. In the second case,
the fact that B had worked for A company in the past offers
a definite clue as to both the work and the wages contem-
plated in the agreement in question. If B in the past
worked as an unskilled laborer, then it is reasonable and
probable to suppose that a relatively similar employment
was intended for the future both as to rate of pay and nature
of work. If B in the past had been a skilled worker then
the employment contemplated in the future would have as
its basis a contemplation and consideration of the status of
B in the past both as to wages and nature of work. To the
general statements expressed above there would neces-
sarily be two qualifications. First, the nature of B's in-
juries might permanently impair his ability to do work
similar to that which he had done prior to his injury. If
such were the case, then the rule would have to be modified
so as to allow for such elasticity as would be occasioned by
the extent of B's injuries. Second, and closely related to
the first, would be the occasion of B 's injury rendering him
less fit to produce value for his employer. In other words
the impairment of his physical condition might lessen his
productive capability, even though he were physically able
to perform the work which he was formerly accustomed to
perform. If such happened to be the case, then the wage
rate under the future agreement could be determined in the
nature of the reasonable worth of B's services. If B were
badly injured testimony could be taken as to what work he
would be able to perform and the pay he would receive for
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such work would be reckoned by its fair value to the com-
pany.
Our discussion thus far has been occasioned by situa-
tions in which suit is brought by B when immediately upon
his recovery, employment is refused him by A company.
The situation in the principal case and in the Heckler case
is somewhat distinguishable. In those cases after recovery
from his injury, B has been given employment by the com-
pany, in one instance for twenty-three years, and in the
other for fourteen years. It is submitted that these facts
make the cases even stronger, for in the light of the work
which B has performed since the injury, it is unreasonable
to say that the court cannot determine the nature and the
wages of the employment contemplated by the contract.
In this discussion we have been contending for a more
flexible rule than that laid down by the Court of Appeals.
It is conceded that the factors mentioned above are far from
absolute but they are valuable and essential in determining
the intention of the parties where neither the wage nor the
work is specified. Recognition of their availability should
enable the courts to fix the rights of the parties. A restate-
ment of the rule would be that where an otherwise valid
employment contract has been entered into and neither the
wage nor the work is definite, it is presumed that the parties
contemplated employment in the same or similar work, and
at a living wage (as ascertained by past employment) or at
a wage equal to the reasonable value of the work performed.
It is suggested that the trend of modern decisions on
this question is in the direction of refusing to invalidate the
contract on the ground of uncertainty.27
As was said earlier in this comment the courts, generally
speaking, view life employment contracts with disfavor, 8
and although the courts in many instances invoke the rule of
uncertainty," as justifying a refusal to enforce the contract,
it is submitted that the controlling grounds for these deci-
sions is not uncertainty but rather evidential difficulties
27 Royster Guano Co. v. Hall, supra note 25; Fisher v. Roper Lumber Co.,
183 N. C. 485, 111 S. E. 857 (1922).
28 Heckler v. B. & 0., supra note 2.
48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 435.
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which seem invariably to accompany such litigation. Among
the factors which would appear to be largely responsible
are: (1) an abundance of evidence that the defendant has
treated the plaintiff with all honesty and fairness, (2) the
often debatable question whether the person promising the
employment for life had the authority to bind the corpora-
tion, (3) evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff of
a reasonable offer of employment. A study of the two re-
cent Maryland cases directly in point reveals the presence
of some one or more of these factors although in TV. B. & A.
Railroad Co. v. Moss,3" a case involving among other things
an indefinite employment contract, none of the above factors
would seem to have been present. In holding the contract
too indefinite for enforcement, the court said: ' "We are
conscious of the feeling that apparently the enforcement of
these rules of law under the facts of this case, does not do
full justice to the parties, yet it is not for courts to make
contracts for parties, but to maintain, unimpaired, the es-
tablished rules of law." But the court added in the follow-
ing paragraph that the plaintiff had another remedy.
The most distressing thing about the principal case is
that the plaintiff allowed himself to be lulled into a false
sense of security and allowed limitations to run on his claim
against the defendant for the original injury. Perhaps the
best solution of this unfortunate type of problem lies in
statutory reform of the statute of limitations to provide
that when a plaintiff forbears to sue because of an unexe-
cuted inducement that limitations shall commence to run
only from the time when the consideration for this forbear-
ance fails.
PROPER VENUE OF SUIT FOR ALIMONY WITHOUT
DIVORCE-OUSTER OF JURISDICTION-AMEND-
MENT-WOODCOCK V. WOODCOCK'
Plaintiff-appellee-wife resided in Baltimore City. De-
fendant-appellant-husband resided in Wicomico County.
The wife filed a suit against the husband in Baltimore City,
Supra, note 14.
a'127 Md. 21.
169 Md. 40, 179 AtI. 826 (1935).
